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On the generality of the effect of experiencing prior gains and losses
on the Iowa Gambling Task: A study on young and old adults
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Abstract
Prospect Theory predicts that people tend to be more risk seeking if their reference point is perceived as a loss and more
risk averse when the reference point is perceived as a gain. In line with this prediction, Franken, Georgieva, Muris and Dijk-
sterhuis (2006) showed that young adults who had a prior experience of monetary gains make more safe choices on subsequent
decisions than subjects who had an early experience of losses. There are no experimental studies on how experiencing prior
gains and losses differently influences young and older adults on a subsequent decision-making task (the Iowa Gambling
Task). Hence, in the current paper, adapting the methodology employed by Franken et al.’s (2006), we intended to test the
generality of their effect across the life span. Overall, we found that subjects who experienced prior monetary gains or prior
monetary losses did not display significant differences in safe/risky choices on subsequent performance in the Iowa Gambling
task. Furthermore, the impact of prior gains and losses on risky/safe card selection did not significantly differ between young
and older adults. These results showed that the effect found in the Franken et al.’s study (2006) is limited in its generality.
Keywords: decision making, Iowa Gambling Task, risk taking, aging, older adults.
1 Introduction
A large body of research has demonstrated that the presen-
tation of choices in terms of gains and losses influences how
people make decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In-
deed, according to Prospect Theory, people tend to be risk
averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain
of losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This effect holds up
well in experiments where subjects are asked to make forced
choices between two hypothetical options in either the gain
or loss domain (for example see Mayhorn, Fisk & Whittle,
2002; Kim, Goldstein, Hasher & Zacks, 2005; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981). However, in a more realistic scenario
where an individual has just lost C3000 in an investment
in shares that have gone sour, how would this loss expe-
rience affect a subsequent investment decision? Will peo-
ple tend to risk more or less than they would in a scenario
where they have just experienced a gain? Little research
has examined the effect of prior gains and prior losses on
subsequent decisions involving the potential of either mon-
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etary gains or losses. There are notable exceptions. For
instance, Thaler and Johnson (1990) investigated, in a se-
ries of experiments, the impact of prior gains and losses on
risky choices and found, contrary to Prospect Theory, in-
creased risk seeking following prior gains. However, the
scenarios used by Thaler and Johnson (1990) were rather ab-
stract, as they consisted of forced choices between options
with clearly defined outcome probabilities. This situation
is, therefore, rather different from the investment scenario
previously described where no outcomes with clear proba-
bilities of occurrence can be identified. If anything, while
investment decisions are known to carry some risk, it is dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to quantify this risk due to the rela-
tively unpredictable behavior of share prices.
In order to assess the impact of prior gains and losses
on a subsequent monetary decision-making task, Franken,
Georgieva, Muris and Dijksterhuis (2006) employed the
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, Tranel & Damasio,
2000), a laboratory task typically used to more closely
mimic those uncertain scenarios associated to financial de-
cisions occurring in real life. In this task, people usually
select 100 cards from four decks with the aim to maximise
their monetary gain at the end of the game. When sub-
jects select a card, they always receive money. However,
for some cards, subjects also incur a monetary penalty. The
four decks from which cards can be selected have different
characteristics that are unknown to the subjects. When se-
lecting from Decks C and D, the amount of money received
is small, thus, given the relatively small size of the mone-
tary penalties, persevering in selecting cards from these two
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decks will assure monetary gains in the long term. On the
contrary, when selecting from the other decks (A and B) a
larger amount of money is received, however the size of the
occasional monetary penalties are sufficiently large to as-
sure monetary losses in the long term. Hence, selections of
cards from Decks C and D can be considered safe and ad-
vantageous, while selections from Decks A and B can be
considered risky and disadvantageous. Subjects should dis-
cover these characteristics of the decks while playing the
IGT (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 2005).
In Franken et al.’s study (2006), a sample of young adults
firstly performed a manipulated version of the IGT where
subjects ended up either gaining or losing, irrespectively of
the strategy used, a fixed amount of money. This provided
the basis for either the prior gain or loss conditions of their
study. Subsequently, subjects performed the standard ver-
sion of the IGT (Bechara et al., 2000) with the initial en-
dowment being the amount of money either gained or lost
in the previous manipulated task. This amount was positive
for subjects in the gain condition and negative for subjects in
the loss condition. Franken and colleagues (2006) claimed
to show that young adults who had an early experience of
gains made more advantageous/safe choices in the IGT than
subjects who had an early experience of losses, thus sup-
porting Prospect Theory. However, they also found that the
significant differences between the gain and the loss groups
were confined to Blocks 2 and 3 out of a total of five blocks
in the IGT, each comprising twenty selected cards.
The methodology employed by Franken and colleagues
(2006) could be used to assess the impact of experiencing
monetary gains or losses on subsequent risk seeking or risk
averse behavior across the life span. According to Prospect
Theory, we should expect risk aversion in the gain domain
and risk seeking in the loss domain also among older adults.
However, given the lack of empirical data on this issue, it
is unclear whether this prediction is correct. Interestingly,
the literature about the effect of framing on decision mak-
ing across the life span has provided a mixed pattern of re-
sults on age-related difference in risk averse and risk seek-
ing behavior that are not always consistent with Prospect
Theory (Best & Charness, 2015). Indeed, in some studies
older adults were found to be more risk averse in the loss
domain than younger adults (Mikels & Reed, 2009; Nielsen,
Knutson & Carstensen, 2008; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007;
Thomas & Millar, 2012). For instance, in a task where sub-
jects could select from either a sure gain (or a sure loss)
or a risky gamble, Mikels and Reed (2009) reported that
both young and old adults tended to avoid the risky gam-
ble in the gain frame (i.e., when the gambling information
was presented positively in terms of gains). However, in the
loss frame (i.e., when the gambling information was pre-
sented negatively in terms of losses), older adults were more
risk averse than younger adults. Conversely, other studies
claimed to show that older adults were more risk averse
than younger adults in the gain domain (Albert & Duffy,
2012; Lauriola & Levin, 2001; Weller, Levin & Denburg,
2011), and that older adults were more risk seeking in the
loss domain than younger counterparts (Lauriola & Levin,
2001; Mather et al., 2012). Finally, other studies did not de-
tect significant age-related selection differences as a func-
tion of either gain or loss domains (Samanez-Larkin et al.,
2007; Thomas & Millar, 2012). In summary, on the basis of
these studies, it is currently unclear whether there is an age-
related effect on decision making in gain vs. loss domains.
Moreover, as mentioned above, none of the aforementioned
age-related studies was designed to investigate the impact
of prior gains and losses on subsequent decisions. There-
fore, exploring how experiencing prior gains and losses dif-
ferently influences young and older adults decision-making
processes may be particularly informative on the analysis
of taking risky decisions in the domain of gains and losses
across the life span.
The purpose of the current study was to test the general-
ity of the effect reported in Franken and colleagues’ study
(2006) in a sample of young and older adults. In particu-
lar, adapting the methodology employed by Franken et al.
(2006), we intended to assess whether prior gains and losses
differently affect young and older adults’ proneness to take
safe/risky choices in a subsequent task. If older adults are
less risk seeking in the loss domain than younger adults
(e.g., Mikels & Reed, 2009; Nielsen et al., 2008; Samanez-
Larkin et al., 2007; Thomas & Millar, 2012), we would
expect that in the standard IGT, particularly so following
prior losses in the manipulated IGT, elderly would select
less disadvantageous cards (i.e., from Decks A and B) than
young adults. Conversely, if older adults are more risk seek-
ing in the loss domain (Lauriola & Levin, 2001; Mather et
al., 2012) than younger adults, then, following prior losses
in the manipulated IGT, they should select more disadvan-
tageous cards (i.e., from Decks A and B) in the standard
IGT. If, on the other hand, young and old adults are equally
sensitive to the impact of prior losses, as in Franken and
colleagues’ study on young adults (2006), we should find
comparable profiles in the loss and gain conditions for both
young and old adults. Finally, given Franken et al.’s find-
ings (2006), it is expected that any difference between prior
gains and prior losses conditions should more likely emerge
in the second and third blocks of the game.
In the present study we also included the Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tel-
legen, 1988) and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE;
Rosenberg, 1979) in order to assess whether (a) the exper-
imental manipulation intended to induce gains and losses
may impact on affect states and self-esteem and (b) the
extent to which any change in affect state and self-esteem
could be associated to more or less safer/riskier behaviours.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of young and older adults as a function of experimental conditions (Prior Gain vs. Prior Loss).
Young adults Older adults
Prior Gain Prior Loss Prior Gain Prior Loss
(n = 25) (n = 25) (n =34) (n = 38)
Subject characteristics M SD M SD M SD M SD
Age 24.44 3.66 24.12 4.19 68.15 6.02 67.92 6.68
Years of education 15.32 2.10 14.68 2.19 14.62 4.25 14.55 3.67
Vocabulary 42.36 4.21 42.92 4.54 45.15 3.43 46.21 5.01
MMSE 28.74 1.40 28.61 1.57
Note: Maximum vocabulary score = 50;Maximum MMSE score = 30
2 Method
2.1 Subjects
Fifty young adults (Mage = 24.28; SD = 3.90; age range:
19–33; 39 females) and 72 older adults (Mage = 68.03; SD
= 6.33; age range: 60–86; 43 females) participated in this
experiment. Older adults were recruited through the local
branch of the University of Third Age located in northern
Italy, where they attended several cultural activities (i.e.,
lessons, conferences, etc.). Younger adults were undergrad-
uate students and received course credits for participating.
About half of the subjects in each age group were ran-
domly allocated to either the prior gain (n = 59; 25 young
adults; 34 older adults) or to the prior loss condition (n =
63; 25 young adults; 38 older adults). Subjects filled out
a general demographic questionnaire so that we could ex-
clude subjects with a history of psychiatric or neurological
disorders and substance abuse. In addition, only for older
adults, an initial screening was made using the Mini Mental
State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein & McHugh,
1975) in order to exclude subjects with a score lower than
26. No subjects was excluded on the basis of above criteria.
A vocabulary test (extracted from the Primary Mental Abil-
ity; Thurstone & Thurstone, 1963) was also presented to
subjects in the study to assess crystallized intelligence. All
subjects completed and accepted an informed consent form
prior to the beginning of the experiment. Descriptive statis-
tics on age, years of education, MMSE, vocabulary scores
are reported in Table 1.
Results of two 2 (Age: Young vs. Old) by 2 (Experimen-
tal Conditions: Prior Gain vs. Prior Loss) analyses of vari-
ance (ANOVA) conducted on years of education and on per-
formance in the vocabulary test showed that older subjects
outperformed younger subjects in vocabulary scores, F(1,
118) = 14.17, MSE = 19.20, p < .001, ηp
2 = .11. No signifi-
cant differences in years of education was detected between
age groups, F(1, 118) = .45, MSE = 11.14, p =.501, ηp
2=
.004. Years of education and vocabulary did not differ be-
tween prior gain and prior loss conditions (Fs ≤ 1.01, ps
≥ .317) and the interactions between age and experimental
conditions were not significant (Fs ≤ .219, ps ≥ .641).
2.2 Materials
2.2.1 Experimental Tasks
The experimental tasks were adapted from Franken and col-
leagues’ study (2006). They consisted in a Manipulated IGT
(M-IGT) and in the Original IGT (O-IGT; Bechara et al.,
2000). The M-IGT was a modified and shorter computer-
based version of the O-IGT. It consisted of 40 trials in which
four decks of cards (A, B, C, D) were presented on a com-
puter screen. Subjects were required to select one card at the
time and they were told that their aim was to try to win as
much money as possible. They started the game with no en-
dowment (i.e., C0). Furthermore, subjects were told neither
the number of trials (i.e., 40) nor the schedule of reinforce-
ments; however, they were told that each card would always
carry a reward as well as, in some cases, a penalty. There
were two versions of the M-IGT: a winning version and a
losing versions where, irrespective of the strategy used to
select the cards, a final gain or a loss, respectively, was ob-
tained. The winning and losing versions of the M-IGT had
predetermined and symmetrical patterns of gains and losses
(the proportion of cards with net losses and net gains was
50% in each deck). In the losing version of the M-IGT, turn-
ing any card from Deck A, B, C or D provided an immediate
return of C50, while, in each deck, in five picks every ten
cards, a penalty of C200 occurred. In the winning versions
of the M-IGT, the reward for any card was C150, while, in
each deck, in five picks (every ten cards) a penalty of C200
occurred (see Table 2 for prototypical patterns of schedules
of rewards and punishments used in the M-IGT). Therefore,
subjects ended with either about a C2000 win or with about
a C2000 loss, irrespectively of the strategy used. The win-
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Table 2: Prototypical pattern of gain-loss of every 10 picks from each of the four decks both in the original IGT and in the
manipulated IGT loss and gain versions.
Original IGT Manipulated IGT
Deck card sequence A B C D ABCD loss version ABCD gain version
1 100 100 50 50 50 150
2 100 100 50 50 50 150
3 100, –150 100 50, –50 50 50, –200 150, –200
4 100 100 50 50 50 150
5 100, –300 100 50, –50 50 50, –200 150, –200
6 100 100 50 50 50 150
7 100, –200 100 50, –50 50 50, –200 150, –200
8 100 100 50 50 50 150
9 100, –250 100,–1250 50, –50 50 50, –200 150, –200
10 100, –350 100 50, –50 50, –250 50, –200 150, –200
ning and the losing versions of the M-IGT were used in the
prior gain and prior loss conditions, respectively.
In the standard O-IGT, as for the M-IGT, subjects had
to select cards from four decks (A, B, C, D) displayed on
a computer screen. Each deck was associated with more
or less favorable contingencies of wins and losses of money
(the contingencies used were the same proposed in the study
of Bechara et al., 2000). Thus, as shown in Table 2, selecting
from decks A and B leads to losses in the long term, while
selecting from decks C and D leads to gains in the long term.
Subjects were simply told that some decks were advanta-
geous, while others were disadvantageous and that their aim
was to gain as much as possible by the end of the game.
However, importantly, subjects did not know either the total
number of cards to be selected nor which were the advan-
tageous and the disadvantageous decks. When a card was
selected from the two advantageous decks (i.e., C and D)
an immediate win of C50 was always delivered, while from
the two disadvantageous decks (i.e., A and B) an immedi-
ate win of C100 was always delivered. However, as well as
sure wins, occasional losses also occurred when cards were
selected (as shown in Table 2). In particular, if subjects con-
stantly selected from Decks A and B, after every ten selec-
tions, each deck provided a cumulative loss of C250. Con-
versely, if subjects constantly selected from Decks C and D,
after every ten selections, each deck leads to a cumulative
gain of C250, so these decks are advantageous in the long
run.
Performance in the O-IGT was scored in two way: (a)
as the number of cards selected from advantageous decks
minus the number of cards selected from disadvantageous
decks for each block of twenty cards (1–20, 21–40, 41–60,
61–80, 81–100) and (b) as the mean frequency of cards se-
lected form Decks A, B, C, D over the task. The first mea-
sure represents the standard analysis used to assess perfor-
mance in the IGT; the second measure provided the basis for
a finer grained analysis of the type of decks selected over the
course of the game. These two measures of the O-IGT were
used as dependent variables in the subsequent analyses.
2.2.2 PANAS and Self-Esteem Scale
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Italian
version Terraciano, McCrae & Costa, 2003; Watson, Clark
& Tellegen, 1988) is a self-report questionnaire consisting
of 10 items (adjectives) for the Positive Affect scale (PA)
and 10 items for the Negative Affect scale (NA). For each
adjective associated to an affect state, subjects are asked to
rate, on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or not
all) to 5 (extremely), the extent to which they experience
each mood state “at the present moment”. The score of sin-
gle items was summed, therefore possible total scores for
both positive and negative affect scale could range from 1 to
50. Higher scores indicate higher levels of either positive or
negative affect states.
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Italian version
Prezza, Trombaccia & Armento, 1997; Rosenberg, 1979) is
a self-report questionnaire consisting of 10-item describing
a series of statement measuring self-worth. Subjects have
to respond to each item using a 4-point scale anchored at 1
(strongly disagree) and 4 (strongly agree). The scores ob-
tained in the single items were added up, therefore possible
total scores could range from 1 to 40. Higher scores indicate
high levels of trait self-esteem.
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2.3 Procedure
The order of tasks administration was the same for all sub-
jects. Firstly, for screening purpose, subjects completed a
demographic questionnaire, the vocabulary subtest drawn
by Primary Mental Ability and, only subjects in the older
age group, the Mini Mental State Examination. Subse-
quently, subjects carried out the Positive and Negative Af-
fect Schedule (PANAS) and Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
(RSES). After having completed the PANAS and RSES,
subjects performed either the winning or the losing version
of the M-IGT. In order to make the experience of gain and
loss more salient, at the end of this task subjects who per-
formed the winning M-IGT and subjects who performed
the losing M-IGT were told that they either gained or lost
more money than average on the task. Immediately after
performing the M-IGT, subjects completed the PANAS and
the RSES for a second time. Finally, they performed the
O-IGT. Before starting the O-IGT, subjects were instructed
that completely new rules applied to this game, as compared
to the M-IGT, thus implying that they should use different
strategies than those used in the M-IGT. Furthermore, they
were informed that their prior gain or loss was the starting
point for the second task. Hence, subjects in the prior loss
and in the prior gain conditions started the O-IGT with an
initial debt or credit of C2000, respectively. Subjects did
not receive real money according to their final monetary win
or loss.
2.4 Analysis
Firstly, to analyze how prior gains or prior losses af-
fected risk taking behavior in general, and more specifi-
cally in young and older adults, a mixed analysis of variance
(ANOVA) 2 (Experimental Conditions: Prior Gain vs. Prior
Loss) by 2 (Age: Young vs. Old) by 5 (O-IGT Blocks: 1-to-
5), was conducted on the number of advantageous (i.e., safe)
minus disadvantageous (i.e., risky) selections in the O-IGT.
Experimental Conditions and Age were between-subjects
factors, while O-IGT Blocks was the within-subjects factor.
Additionally, we performed follow-up independent-samples
t-tests between prior gains and prior losses groups based on
the a priori hypothesis that in Blocks 2 and 3 subjects in the
prior gain group should select more advantageous choices
than subjects in the prior loss group (Franken et al., 2006).
This a priori follow-up was based on the finding of Franken
and colleagues’ study (2006). In particular, on the basis of
their data, the estimated average size of the effect of the gain
vs. loss conditions on selecting more advantageous cards
across Blocks 2 and 3 is d = 0.96. Hence, given our over-
all sample size, the power to detect this effect, for an alpha
level of 0.05, was about 0.95.
Second, to analyze the strategy used in prior gains and
prior losses experimental conditions, mean frequencies of
decks’ selection in the O-IGT were analyzed using a four
factors mixed ANOVA 4 (Deck: A, B, C, D) by 5 (O-IGT
Blocks: 1-to-5) by 2 (Experimental Conditions: Prior Gain
vs. Prior Loss) by 2 (Age: Young vs. Old). Experimen-
tal Conditions and Age were between-subjects factors and
Deck and O-IGT Blocks were within-subjects factors. In
this analysis we will primarily focus on any change in the
decks’ selection over the course of the game and on any ef-
fect on decks’ selection of both Age and the Experimental
Conditions.
Third, in order to assess whether the experimental ma-
nipulation influenced affect states and self-esteem, a three
factors mixed ANOVA 2 (Experimental Conditions: Prior
Gain vs. Prior Loss) by 2 (Time of measurement: Before
M-IGT vs. After M-IGT) by 2 (Age: Young vs. Old adults)
was conducted on scores from the PANAS and on Rosen-
berg Self-Esteem Scale. Since the results in the PANAS
negative affect scale were severely limited by a floor effect
(i.e., subjects selected a score of one most of the times), re-
sults concerning the negative affect state could not be mean-
ingfully analyzed. Experimental Conditions and Age were
between-subjects factors and Time of measurement was the
within-subjects factors.
The significance level adopted for all analyses was 0.05,
unless otherwise stated. Paired t-tests were used to follow-
up significant F ratios. Since there were at most six pairwise
comparisons, the significance level adopted for these follow-
up analyses was 0.008.
3 Results
3.1 Advantageous minus disadvantageous se-
lections in the O-IGT
Blocks had a significant main effect, F(4, 472) = 15.03,MSE
= 62.66, p < .001, ηp² = .113, indicating that subjects’ fre-
quency of advantageous selections increased from Block 1
to Block 5. In particular, there were significant increments
from Block 1 to Block 2, t(121) = 5.45, p < .001, Block 3,
t(121) = 4.66, p < .001, Block 4, t(121) = 6.02, p < .001,
and Block 5, t(121) = 5.61, p < .001. No significant dif-
ferences occurred between Blocks 2 through 5, ts ≤ 1.73,
ps ≥ .087. Overall, then subjects moved from selecting
more from disadvantageous decks (A and B) to more ad-
vantageous decks (C and D). Figure 1 displays the mean
difference between frequency of advantageous and disad-
vantageous selections of both starting conditions over the
five blocks of the O-IGT. The main effect of age and ex-
perimental condition were not significant, Fs ≤ .06, ps ≥
.807. Neither was the two-way interaction between Blocks
and Experimental Condition, F(4, 472) = .76,MSE = 62.66,
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Figure 1: The mean difference between the frequency of ad-
vantageous (C+D) minus disadvantageous selections (A+B)
for each of the five original IGT blocks 1-to-5 as a function
of the prior gain and prior loss conditions. Bars indicate
confidence interval. (See the appendix for tabular version.
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p = .553, ηp² = .006. From the planned t-tests between gain
and loss conditions at Blocks 2 and 3 no significant differ-
ences emerged: Block 2, t(120) = 0.90, p = .368; Block 3,
t(120) = 0.87, p = .385. Overall, it appears that, contrary to
Franken et al.’s study (2006), there was no significant dif-
ferences in the impact of prior gains vs. losses on O-IGT
scores. In particular, the planned t-tests failed to reject the
null hypothesis of no difference between advantageous and
disadvantageous selection at Block 2 and 3 despite this ex-
periment had a power of 0.95 to detect an effect size of the
magnitude obtained by Franken et al. (2006).
The two-way Block by Age interaction was not signifi-
cant, F(4, 472) = .75, MSE = 62.66, p = .557, ηp² = .006,
indicating a similar performance in old and young adults
over time. Similarly, the three-way interaction was not sig-
nificant, F(4, 472) = .67, MSE = 62.66, p = .616, ηp² =
.006. Figure 2 displays the mean difference between the
frequencies of advantageous and disadvantageous selections
as a function of the five blocks, the starting conditions and
age groups. Overall, it appears that subjects started select-
ing more from advantageous decks relatively early in the
game, however, unlike Franken et al. (2006), there was no
significant difference between gains and losses conditions.
Furthermore, the profile of the performance over time was
comparable between age groups in both prior gains and prior
losses conditions.
Figure 2: The mean difference between the frequency of ad-
vantageous (C+D) minus disadvantageous selections (A+B)
for each of the five original IGT blocks 1-to-5 as a function
of age group (young adults vs. old adults) for the prior gain
and prior loss conditions. Bars indicate confidence interval.
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3.2 Mean frequencies of decks’ selection over
the O-IGT
Deck (A, B, C, or D) had a significant main effect, F(3,
354) = 38.23, MSE = 41.20, p < .001, ηp² = .245. Planned
comparisons indicated that subjects selected Deck A signifi-
cantly less often than any other decks (ts≥ 8.64, ps < .001).
The two-way interaction Decks by Blocks was significant,
F(12, 1416) = 7.57, MSE = 13.590, p < .001, ηp² = .06. In-
specting Figure 3, it can be noticed that over time subjects
tended to select more readily from the advantageous Decks
C and D and tended to avoid selecting the disadvantageous
Deck A. However, it also appears that disadvantageous Deck
B, i.e. the one delivering, on average, only one large loss ev-
ery 10 selection, was selected frequently throughout the en-
tire game. Finally none of the other interactions approached
significance, Fs ≤ 1.01, ps ≥ .389. In summary, the anal-
ysis of frequencies of cards’ selections from the different
decks showed that, irrespectively of the starting condition,
subjects could rapidly identify Deck A as being disadvan-
tageous and Decks C and D as being advantageous; how-
ever subjects found it difficult identifying, even at the lat-
est stages of the game, the disadvantageous nature of Deck
B. This most likely occurred because Deck B delivers large
rewards frequently, but large losses rarely (1 out of every
10 cards) (for similar findings and considerations see Ste-
ingroever, Wetzels, Horstmann, Neumann & Wagenmakers,
2013).
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Figure 3: The mean frequencies of cards selected from each deck (A, B, C, D) by the five original IGT blocks 1-to-5 as a
function of prior gain and prior loss conditions. Bars indicate confidence interval. (See the appendix for a tabular version.)
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3.3 PANAS positive affect scale and Self-
Esteem Scale
The positive affect scale from PANAS showed a Time of
measurement by Experimental Conditions interaction, F(1,
118) = 6.14, MSE = 8.84, p = .015, ηp² =.05. Indeed, posi-
tive affect decreased after performance on the losing version
of the M-IGT (Before M-IGT: M = 31.13, SD = 4.95; Af-
ter M-IGT: M = 29.86, SD = 6.20), t(62) = 2.21, p = .031,
while it did not significantly differ in the winning version
of the M-IGT (Before M-IGT: M = 29.83, SD = 5.68; Af-
ter M-IGT: M = 30.17, SD = 6.34), t(58) = 0.66, p = .514.
Moreover, the three-way interaction between Time of mea-
surement, Experimental Condition and Age was significant,
F(1, 118) = 5.64, MSE = 8.84, p < .019, ηp² =.05.
To better describe the three-way interaction, we con-
ducted two separate follow-up analyses to assess the com-
bined effect of experimental condition and time of measure-
ment separately for the young and old age groups, respec-
tively. In the younger adult group, a significant Time of
measurement by Experimental Condition occurred, F(1, 48)
= 10.04, MSE = 8.80, p = .003, ηp² = .17, indicating that
positive affect decreased after performing the losing version
(Before M-IGT: M = 32.84, SD = 5.88; After M-IGT: M =
30.88, SD = 6.25), t(24) = 2.18, p = .040, and increased after
performing the winning version of the M-IGT (Before M-
IGT: M = 28.88, SD = 5.71; After M-IGT: M = 30.68, SD =
6.13), t(24) = 2.33, p = .029. In the older adult group, no sig-
nificant interaction occurred, F(1, 70) = .01, MSE = 8.87, p
= .936, ηp² =.00, indicating that positive affect changed nei-
ther after performing the losing (Before M-IGT:M = 30.00,
SD = 3.92; After M-IGT: M = 29.18, SD = 6.16), nor the
winning version of the M-IGT (Before M-IGT: M = 30.53,
SD = 5.64; After M-IGT: M = 29.79, SD = 6.56), ts ≤ 1.15,
ps ≥ .259.
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale showed a significant
Time of measurement by Experimental Conditions interac-
tion, F(1, 118) = 6.71,MSE = 2.31, p = .011, ηp² =.05, indi-
cating a significant increase of self-esteem after the winning
version of the M-IGT, (Before M-IGT: M = 31.04, DS =
3.93; After M-IGT:M = 31.64, DS = 4.39), t(58) = 2.10, p =
.040, but not after the losing version of the M-IGT, (Before
M-IGT: M = 31.31, DS = 4.13; After M-IGT: M = 30.87,
DS = 4.66), t(62) = 1.64, p = .105. None of the other inter-
actions approached significance, Fs ≤ 2.24, ps ≥ .137.
4 Discussion
The present study aimed to assess whether the experience
of prior monetary gains and losses differently affect young
and older adults’ subsequent choices in a decision-making
task mimicking the uncertainty of real investment scenarios.
To this aim, we adapted the methodology used by Franken
et al. (2006). This also provided an opportunity to assess
possible age effects. Young and old adults performed the
classical version of the IGT after having performed a ma-
nipulated version of the IGT resulting in either a gain or a
loss reference point.
Our results showed that, overall, subjects who experi-
enced prior monetary gains or prior monetary losses did not
display significant differences in safe/risky choices in sub-
sequently performing the O-IGT. Furthermore, the impact
of prior gains and losses on risky/safe choice behavior did
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not significantly differ between age groups. Our failure to
detect an increased risk taking in the loss condition (or con-
versely greater risk aversion in the gain condition) on the
subsequent selection of advantageous vs. disadvantageous
decks is at odds with Franken et al.’s results (2006).
A lack of statistical power in our experiment is unlikely to
account for our results. Given the absence of an age effect,
we pooled both age groups in order to have an overall sam-
ple of 122 subjects against the 50 subjects of the Franken
et al.’s study (2006). Hence, our overall sample included
2.5 times as many observations as the original sample size,
thus providing a suitable size attempt to generalize previous
findings (Simonsohn, 2015). Moreover, with a predicted ef-
fect size of d = 0.96, estimated from Franken et al.’s study
(2006), our experiment had a probability of 0.95 to detect
such an effect. Hence, it appears that, on the basis of the
results of the present study, the effect reported in Franken
and colleagues’ study (2006) is not a phenomenon that can
be readily obtained in an experimental context that differs
from the one originally adopted.
There are, indeed, methodological differences between
the present study and the Franken et al.’s study (2006) that
should be considered for the inconsistency in the results be-
tween the two studies.
Firstly, Franken and colleagues (2006) used real mone-
tary remuneration as a function of task performance, while
we did not. Hence, the absence of a monetary remuneration
resulting from subjects’ winnings and losses on the O-IGT
might have affected motivation in task performance (Mikels
& Reed, 2009). Indeed, some studies showed that the type
of reinforcement (real vs. no or fictitious money) could in-
fluence behavioral decision making (Hertwig & Ortmann,
2001; Weinberg, Riesel & Proudfit, 2014) and, in particu-
lar, risk aversion (Ferrey & Mishra, 2014; Holt & Laury,
2002). On the other hand, however, this type of evidence
contrasts with other studies carried out using the IGT that
failed to find significant differences in the rate of learning of
IGT contingencies as a function of reinforcement type (e.g.,
Bowman & Turnbull, 2003; Fernie & Tunney, 2006). If real
monetary reinforcement matters, we would expect subjects,
at least in the gain condition, to learn faster in the Franken
et al.’s study (2006) than in the present study.
In order to assess this hypothesis, we calculated the slopes
measuring the learning rate in the IGT from the first to
the third block of 20 trials in both the gain (i.e., 4.32) and
the loss (i.e., 1.32) conditions of the Franken et al.’s study
(2006) and we used these values as point estimates (i.e., as if
these values were the mean of the null hypothesis to be used
in a t-test).1 The third block was used because at this point
a slower performance was clearly detected in the loss con-
dition over the gain condition in the Franken et al.’s study
and because, following this block, performance in the gain
1We would like to thank the Editor for providing us with the means and
the standard error associated with Figure 1 of Franken et al. (2006, p. 156).
and loss conditions tended to equate and reached asymptote.
We then computed, for each of our subjects, these slopes
for both gain and loss conditions and calculate their means
and standard errors. For the gain condition the mean slope
was 2.25 (SE = 0.815) and for the loss conditions the mean
slope was 2.71 (SE = 0.705). We then performed one sam-
ple t-test against the point estimates obtained from Franken
et al.’s study (2006). In the gain condition we obtained t(58)
= –2.54, p = .018 against a point estimate of 4.32 (limits of
the 95% CI: 0.618 and 3.881), while in the loss condition
we obtained t(62) = 1.98, p = .058 against a point estimate
of 1.32 (limits of the 95% CI: 1.305 and 4.123). These re-
sults indicate that slower learning rates emerged in the gain
condition of our study as compared to Franken et al.’s study
(2006). Moreover, the average learning rate in the first three
blocks of the loss condition of our study was marginally
faster than the average learning rate in Franken et al.’s study
(2006). Overall, the comparison of the learning rates across
the two studies seems to support the view that monetary re-
wards may have a positive impact on the learning rate in the
gain condition, while in the loss condition these tended to
be slower. For completeness, there were no significant dif-
ferences in the slopes between the gain and loss conditions
in our study, t(160) = 0.67.
Although the use of real vs. fictitious amounts of money
may have contributed to the differences in the learning rates
detected, it is important to consider that despite no real
money being won/lost in our study, the experimental manip-
ulation of gains and losses was effective in inducing changes
in affect states. This suggests that subjects took the task se-
riously enough to be disappointed even when they lost fic-
titious amounts of money. Therefore, it seems premature
to attribute the lack of an effect of the gain/loss manipula-
tion on the learning rate in our study to the fact that no real
money was used as incentive.
Secondly, the amount of fictitious money gained or lost
in the M-IGT was different from that used in the Franken
et al.’s study (2006). While Franken and colleagues (2006)
used more realistic amount of money won or lost as a func-
tion of the modified IGT performance (i.e., a gain of C4 in
the prior gain condition and a loss of C10 in the prior loss
condition), in the present study subjects won or lost about
C2000 as a consequence of their M-IGT performance. The
high amounts of virtual money won or lost in the present
study might have contributed further to the feeling that it
was not a real task but just a game and it might consequently
have influenced the strategy adopted by subjects during the
subsequent O-IGT.
Furthermore, as a third difference, the amount of trials
(i.e., 100 trials) presented in the modified IGT of Franken et
al.’s study (2006) was longer than the amount of trials used
in the present study (i.e., 40 trials). This difference might
have affected early preferences for blocks in the subsequent
O-IGT.
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Despite these methodological differences between our
and Franken et al.’s study (2006), it would be expected that,
if the effect of prior gains/losses on the performance of the
IGT is robust, it would be relatively easy to be obtained in a
different experimental context.
The analysis we performed on decks’ selection helps to
shed light on the strategy used by subjects and thus may
help understanding why different outcomes were found in
our and in Franken et al.’s study (2006). Overall, the mean
frequencies of cards selected from each deck (A, B, C, D)
across the five blocks of the IGT was comparable in prior
gains and prior losses conditions. It is noticeable, and com-
patible with the learning of the contingencies of the IGT,
that the frequency of choice of the disadvantageous Deck
A decreased as the task progressed, and that the frequency
of selection of the advantageous Decks C and D increased
over the five blocks. Indeed, from Block 2 it is already ev-
ident that advantageous Decks C and D were selected more
frequently than Deck A. However, and critically, the disad-
vantageous Deck B was selected with a similar frequency
to Decks C and D across the entire game, irrespectively of
the gains and losses conditions. Deck B features high fre-
quency of relatively large gains and very infrequent large
losses; thus, similarly to advantageous Decks C and D, it
delivers infrequent net losses. A recent review by Stein-
groever and colleagues (2013) claimed to show that, across
a very large set of studies using the IGT, it is common to
observe large proportions of subjects promptly discarding
the disadvantageous Deck A but persistently selecting the
disadvantageous Deck B. This effect, called the “prominent
Deck B” phenomenon, was reported in a variety of stud-
ies (e.g., Dunn, Dalgleish & Lawrence, 2006; Lin, Chiu,
Lee & Hsieh, 2007; Toplak, Jain & Tannock, 2005). For
instance, Lin and colleagues (2007) suggested that Deck B
may be difficult to disregard due to its similarity to the ad-
vantageous Decks C and D; indeed, unlike Deck A, no or
very few net losses are associated to all these three decks.
This hypothesis is also supported by the results of a recent
study where subjects were asked to try to lose, instead of
winning, as much money as possible in the standard IGT
(Wright, Rakow & Russo, 2015). Due to the reverse na-
ture of the instructions, Deck B became a favorable deck;
nonetheless, this tended to be selected as frequently as the
now unfavorable Decks C and D.
On the basis of the above considerations and of the em-
pirical evidence provided about the pervasive preference for
the disadvantageous Deck B (Steingroever et al., 2013), it
seems possible that a large proportions of the subjects in
the loss group of Franken et al.’s study (2006) fortuitously
showed a preference for Deck B very early in the IGT. This
preference might have inflated the number of cards selected
by subjects from disadvantageous decks: a selection pattern
that persisted also in the early middle blocks of the game
(we assume, on the basis of the evidence reviewed above,
that Deck A would have been discarded relatively quickly).
This hypothesis, however, could not be directly tested as no
decks analysis is provided in Franken et al.’s study (2006).
The outcome of the present study provided further inter-
esting results. Firstly, with respect to the issue of potential
age related differences in performing the IGT, we found that
both young and older adults learned to distinguish, in a com-
parable way, advantageous from disadvantageous decks rel-
atively early in the game, and this learning was retained until
the end of the task. Therefore, our findings add to the body
of evidence showing age-related differences in performing
the IGT are either minimal or non-existent (e.g., Henninger
& Madden, 2010; MacPherson, Louise & Della Sala, 2002;
Shneider & Parente, 2006).
Secondly we found, in line with Franken and colleagues’
study (2006), an increase of positive affect following mon-
etary gains in the manipulated version of the IGT, and a
decrement of positive affect following the monetary losses,
albeit primarily in the young adults group; older adults
did not report changes in positive affect. The absence of
changes in positive affect among older adults seems to im-
ply that elderly are less susceptible to the impact of mon-
etary gains and losses than younger adults. However, and
interestingly, previous studies reported that older adults dis-
played significantly lower levels of affect variability than
young adults in association to both positive and negative
daily events (e.g., Röcke, Li & Smith, 2009). Further-
more, studies on age-related differences in physiological re-
activity on affective states (Levenson, Carstensen, Friesen
& Ekman, 1991) reported a decline in physiological reac-
tivity among older adults in emotional tasks. For instance,
it has been reported that older adults show reduced phys-
iological arousal when watching emotional movies (Tsai,
Levanson & Carstensen, 2000) than younger adults. Hence,
our results provide further empirical support to those stud-
ies reporting that older adults are less affectively reactive
than younger adults to positive and negative stimuli (e.g.,
Röcke et al., 2009; Tsai et al., 2000). Finally, the absence
of changes in positive affect following monetary gains and
losses in older adults did not affect results on the manifesta-
tion of safe/risky behaviours in the IGT in the older group.
Younger adults, despite showing changes in positive affect
following the gain/loss manipulations, did not display differ-
ences in safe/risky choices as a function of prior gains and
losses. Moreover, and interestingly, we found across sub-
jects an increase of self-esteem following monetary gains in
the manipulated version of the IGT. Hence, despite subjects
showed changes in self-esteem following the winning ver-
sion of the IGT, they did not display differences in safe/risky
behaviors in the subsequent decision-making task.
In conclusion, although further work is required to gain
a more complete understanding of the impact of prior
gains/losses on decision making across the life span, our
results showed that experiencing prior monetary gains and
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losses is unlikely to affect subsequent safe/risky decision be-
havior in both young and older adults. Hence, the results of
the present study should serve as a warning that the effect of
experiencing prior gains and losses on subsequent decision
making is not easy to get. However, it is important to point
out that this result was detected using a specific task aimed
to mimic the uncertainty of real life investment scenarios.
Therefore, future studies should try to extend the present
methodology to different tasks to assess the generalizabil-
ity of the present findings. Furthermore, we hope that this
study provides the impetus for further research to be con-
ducted on the impact of prior gains and losses on decision
making across the life span.
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Appendix: Means (M) and confidence intervals (95% C.I.) of Figures 1 and 3
Table A1: Confidence intervals and the mean difference between the frequency of advantageous (C+D) minus disadvan-
tageous selections (A+B) for each of the five original IGT blocks 1-to-5 as a function of the prior gain and prior loss
conditions. The values correspond to Figure 1 of the paper.
Prior Gain Prior Loss
M 95% C.I. M 95% C.I.
Block 1 –2.17 –4.58 – 0.24 –1.65 –3.98 – 0.68
Block 2 3.49 1.39 – 5.59 4.83 2.79 – 6.86
Block 3 2.34 –0.01 – 4.69 3.78 1.51 – 6.05
Block 4 5.32 2.89 – 7.76 3.97 1.61 – 6.32
Block 5 5.39 2.65 – 8.13 4.03 1.38 – 6.68
Table A2: Confidence Intervals and the mean frequencies of cards selected from each deck (A, B, C, D) by the five original
IGT blocks 1-to-5 as a function of prior gain and prior loss conditions. The values correspond to Figure 3 of the paper.
A B C D
M 95% C.I. M 95% C.I. M 95% C.I. M 95% C.I.
Prior gain
Block 1 4.17 3.42 – 4.92 6.92 5.83 – 7.99 4.27 3.54 – 5.00 4.64 3.56 – 5.73
Block 2 2.73 2.19 – 3.27 5.53 4.65 – 6.40 5.88 5.05 – 6.71 5.86 4.92 – 6.81
Block 3 2.85 2.25 – 3.63 5.98 5.04 – 6.92 5.09 4.08 – 6.09 6.09 4.88 – 7.29
Block 4 2.09 1.54 – 2.63 5.25 4.21 – 6.30 5.39 4.22 – 6.56 7.27 5.96 – 8.58
Block 5 1.64 1.17 – 2.12 5.66 4.45 – 6.87 6.31 5.10 – 7.50 6.39 5.09 – 7.69
Prior loss
Block 1 4.19 3.46 – 4.92 6.64 5.59 – 7.68 4.92 4.22 – 5.63 4.25 3.21 – 5.30
Block 2 2.46 1.94 – 2.98 5.13 4.28 – 5.97 5.40 4.60 – 6.20 7.02 6.10 – 7.93
Block 3 2.87 2.29 – 3.46 5.24 4.33 – 6.15 4.62 3.64 – 5.60 7.27 6.10 – 8.44
Block 4 2.16 1.63 – 2.69 5.86 4.84 – 6.87 5.00 3.87 – 6.13 6.98 5.71 – 8.26
Block 5 1.87 1.41 – 2.33 6.11 4.94 – 7.28 5.18 4.01 – 6.34 6.84 5.58 – 8.10
